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I. INTRODUCTION
W hEN CONGRESS enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of
H1978 (ADA), it included a preemption provision that pre-
vented states from enacting or enforcing a law that "related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier."1 Congress, however, did
not define "service."' 2 As a result, courts faced with ADA pre-
emption issues were uncertain whether the ADA preempted
run-of-the-mill personal injury claims because they "related to" a
"service" provided by the airlines, such as serving hot drinks and
food, stowing luggage, and passenger assistance.3 Since its 1978
enactment, the courts have continued to struggle with the in-
tended scope of the ADA's preemption provision as it applies to
service-related airline torts.4 In 1998, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit delivered an opinion in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,5
I See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
2 See Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83 (D. Mass. 1999).
Although "service" was not defined, Congress did define "[a]il-cargo air service"
to mean "the carriage by aircraft in interstate or overseas air transportation of
only property or mail, or both." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (11) (1988) (amended
and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (1994)). Section 40102 does not define
either "service" or "all-cargo air service." See 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (changing the
name "all-cargo air service" to "all-cargo air transportation").
3 See Somes, 33 F. Supp. at 84 (discussing the decisions of numerous courts re-
garding whether the ADA preempted such claims).
4 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that the courts have "struggled with the relationship between the
Act's preemption clause and state tort claims").
5 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), reh'g denied, 169 F.3d 594, 595 (9th
Cir 1999) (en banc).
that defined "service" in such a way that the ADA would not pre-
empt routine aviation personal injury claims.6
This article examines the Charas decision, including the im-
pact it may have on future ADA preemption cases. First, this
article looks at the statutory evolution of the ADA.7 Next, the
author discusses Supreme Court precedent relating to the scope
of the ADA's preemption provision.8 Then, this article analyzes
the court's opinion in Charas.9 This article then addresses the
potential impact of Charas on future cases, including the extent
to which other federal courts are likely to adopt the Charas defi-
nition of "service." 10 Finally, the article concludes that the
Ninth Circuit correctly decided Charas, and recommends that
other courts apply its definition of "service" in future ADA pre-
emption cases."
II. STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF THE ADA
In 1938, Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193812
to "regulate entry into the interstate airline industry, the routes
that airlines could fly, and the fares that they could charge con-
sumers."13 Although this provision granted the Civil Aeronau-
6 This article focuses on preemption as it relates to airline negligence in situa-
tions similar to those described in the Introduction. For a more detailed discus-
sion of select preemption issues, such as employment related claims and
negligent product design, see Richard Schoolman, Developments in the Preemption
of Otherwise Justiciable Employment-Related Claims by the Railway Labor Act and the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, SA31 ALI-ABA 721 (1996); Lance M. Harvey, Note, Cleveland v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.: The Tenth Circuit Holds that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Does
Not Preempt State Common Law Claims for Negligent Design, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 485
(1994); Shari L. Pitko, Aviation Law: Preemption of State Law Tort Claims by the Fed-
eral Aviation Act Do State Law Tort Claims Survive the Attack? [ Cleveland v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993], 33 WASHBURN L.J. 234 (1993).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See infra Part V.
In See infra Part VI.
12 Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988)) (recodified at
49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (1994)).
13 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 411, 52 Stat. at 987-994);
see also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298-300 (1976). For his-
torical purposes, the 1938 Act was actually Congress's second effort to regulate
aviation. Congress first used its Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate
aviation in 1926 with the enactment of the Air Commerce Act. SeeAir Commerce
Act of 1926, § 1, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed 1938).
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tics Board (CAB) 14 the primary authority to regulate interstate
air transportation, the 1938 Act did not expressly preempt con-
current state regulation. 15 The Act also specifically contained a
"savings clause" that preserved existing common law and statu-
tory remedies.' 6  The 1938 savings clause provided that
"[n] othing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies."17
In 1958, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(FAA). 8 Although the FAA replaced the 1938 Act, it left in
place the states' authority to regulate the airline industry as well
as the savings clause. 9 For the next twenty years, the FAA's stat-
utory scheme permitted heavy interstate federal government
regulation of the airlines without specifically preempting con-
current state regulation of intrastate air travel.20 One House Re-
port summarized the problem:
Existing law contains no specific provision on the jurisdiction of
the States [sic] and the Federal Government [sic] over airlines
which provide both intrastate and interstate service. The lack of
specific provisions has created uncertainties and conflicts, includ-
ing situations in which carriers have been required to charge dif-
ferent fares for passengers traveling between two cities,
depending on whether these passengers were interstate passen-
gers whose fares are regulated by the [Civil Aeronautics Board],
or intrastate passengers, whose fare is regulated by a State. 1
As a result of this uncertain regulation, states continued to
enforce their own laws on the airlines, despite the additional
regulation and economic impact these laws had on the airline
14 Initially, the 1938 Act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA). In
1940, the CAA's name was changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board. See Morales,
504 U.S. at 422 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the name change pursu-
ant to Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940).
15 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
16 See § 1106, 52 Stat. at 1027; Nader, 426 U.S. at 298-300. The current version
of the savings clause is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994).
17 § 1106, 52 Stat. at 1027.
18 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1301-1557 (1988) (current provisions codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 et seq.).
19 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 422.
20 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378. (citing California v. CAB, 581 F.2d 954, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (recognizing that "[d]ual economic regulation by federal and
state agencies has produced a conflict").
21 H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 15-16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737,
3751-52.
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industry.22 In addition, with the savings clause provision still in
force, common law suits under this provision continued.23
Until 1978, federal regulation, state regulation, and savings
clause suits continued to impact the aviation industry's economy
and market forces.24 In 1978, Congress responded to this threat
by determining that "maximum reliance on competitive market
forces," rather than pervasive federal regulation, would best im-
prove the quality, innovation, efficiency, and prices of air trans-
portation.25 To accomplish this objective, Congress enacted the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.26 "To ensure that the States
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their
own," the ADA included a specific preemption provision appli-
cable to the states. 27 The teeth of the ADA's preemption provi-
sion provided that: "[n]o State . . .shall enact or enforce any
law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to the rates, routes, or service of any
air carrier."2
8
22 See, e.g., Nader, 426 U.S. at 300-01 (finding that the preemption provision did
not prevent states from prohibiting deceptive trade practices laws against the air-
lines); Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 190 (noting that interstate travel was "heavily
regulated by the federal government"); California v. CAB, 581 F.2d at 956 (per-
mitting states to regulate airfares despite its economic impact on airlines with
interstate air transportation).
23 See Nader, 426 U.S. at 300-01 (noting that the savings clause allowed a state
tort action to coexist with the Federal Aviation Act).
24 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 422-23 (Stephens, J. dissenting) (discussing Con-
gress's decision to enact the ADA); Somes, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 80-81.
25 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a) (6), (12) (1994) (set-
ting forth the economic policy of airline deregulation).
26 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988) (cur-
rent provisions codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.).
27 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
28 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (a) (1) (emphasis added) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713 (1994)). Congress amended and recodified section 1305(a) (1) in the
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), Pub. L. No.
103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.). The cur-
rent version of the preemption provision, § 41713, provides, in relevant part:
"Preemption. - - (1) Except as provided in this subsection, a State ... may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect
of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b).
Although Congress changed the language from the 1978 to 1994 version, the
Supreme Court has declared that Congress intended no substantive change in
the Act's meaning and effect. SeeAmerican Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,
223 n.1 (1995) (citing Pub.L. No. 103-272, § 1 (a), 108 Stat. 745); see also Deerskin
Trading Post, Inc. v. UPS, 972 F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (noting that
Congress intended identical application of the preemption provision).
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Following the ADA's enactment, courts recognized a signifi-
cant uncertainty in aviation tort law.29 Specifically, the courts
were unclear about the interrelationship between the ADA's
preemption clause and Congress's retention of the savings
clause. ° For example, did Congress intend the language "relat-
ing to . . . service" to include the various and sundry activities
carried on by airlines such as stowing baggage, serving bever-
ages, and controlling passenger behavior, or did it mean some-
thing else? Did the ADA preempt all passenger-assistance-
related state tort law claims because they related to "service," or
were those claims still viable under the savings clause? Because
Congress did not define "service," the courts differed as to
whether the ADA preempted airline negligence claims. 1 In
1992, however, the Supreme Court offered some guidance,
although hardly definitive, about whether the ADA's preemp-
tion provision applied to state tort law claims.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: IN SEARCH OF A
DEFINITION OF "SERVICE"
Since the ADA's birth in 1978, the United States Supreme
Court has attempted to define the ADA's preemptive scope on
two occasions. 2 First, in 1992, the Court in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.3 3 focused on the "relates to" language to de-
termine whether state enforcement of airline advertising fell
within the scope of the ADA 4.3  Then, in 1995, the Court again
revisited the ADA preemption provision in American Airlines, Inc.
29 See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 192.
30 See id.
31 See Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (D.C. D.C. 1985) (find-
ing that the "legislative history is clear that this Act ... preempted any state laws
relating to air carrier services," which includes the regulation of air carrier seat-
ing policies). Compare Chukwu v. Board of Dir's. British Airways, 889 F. Supp. 12,
14 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding slander claim preempted) with Fenn v. American
Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (finding slander claim
not preempted).
32 Prior to the ADA of 1978, the Supreme Court had one other occasion to
examine preemption under the 1958 Act. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). The Burbank Court found that the 1958 Act's
federal noise control regulations preempted concurrent state noise control regu-
lations on Supremacy Clause grounds as opposed to any express preemption pro-
vision in the Act. See id. at 633-35; see also U.S CONST. art. VI.
33 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
34 See id. at 378.
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v. Wolens.15 This time, the Court focused on the meaning of "en-
act" as used in § 1305(a) (1).6
Although the Court's majority opinions did not specifically
address the preemption provision's effect on state tort law
claims in either case, several Justices' concurring opinions did.
For this reason, a closer examination of the opinions in Morales
and Wolens is warranted.
A. MORALES V. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) created guidelines that outlined specific standards gov-
erning airline advertising, the awarding of frequent-flyer miles,
and the payment of compensation to passengers who gave up
their seats on overbooked flights. 37 Over objection by the air-
lines and the Department of Transportation, seven attorney
generals sought to enforce the standards, first by way of written
memoranda to the airlines, then by way of a formal notice of
intent to sue for noncompliance. 8 The airlines sued in federal
district court, alleging that the state guidelines related to rates,
routes, or services, and were therefore preempted by the ADA.39
Accordingly, the Morales Court set out to determine whether
the ADA preempted state deceptive advertising laws and guide-
35 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
36 See id. at 226. Section 1305(a) (1) was amended in 1994 and recodified with-
out substantial change as 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b), the current ADA preemption
provision. The minor changes that Congress made included substituting the
word "price" in place of "rates" and changing "routes" to "route" in the 1994
version. Compare 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1) (1988) with 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)
(1994).
37 See Morales, 504 U.S., at 379. The Introduction section of the guidelines spe-
cifically stated that the guidelines intended to "explain" existing state laws gov-
erning these topics rather than "create" any new laws. See id.
38 See id. at 379-80. Although a number of state attorney generals had joined in
the memorandum sent to TWA seeking compliance, it was eventually the Novem-
ber 14, 1998, notice of intent to sue letter, drafted by the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas, that precipitated TWA's suit. See id. at 380.
39 See id. (seeking largely a declaratory judgment that the ADA preempted the
states enforcement of the NAAG Guidelines). Finding that TWA's preemption
would likely be successful, the district court entered an injunction against Texas,
enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing the guidelines. See id. When the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, the District Court per-
manently enjoined the states from enforcing the NAAG Guidelines, which again
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consid-
ered briefs from both sides, including briefs from thirty-one State Attorney
Generals. See id. at 375-77, 380.
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lines applied to the airlines.4° Focusing on the meaning of "re-
lating to," the Court interpreted these words broadly to mean
"to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to per-
tain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.'
The majority concluded that the guidelines clearly "relate to"
airline rates and added that state regulation on airline advertis-
ing had the "forbidden significant effect" on rates, routes, or
service, and thus were expressly preempted by the ADA." Ac-
cordingly, the Morales majority held that state restrictions on air-
line fare advertising constituted exactly the type of regulation
that Congress intended to preempt.4
Although the Court did not have before it an opportunity to
interpret the meaning of "services," or to otherwise define the
scope of ADA preemption as it relates to common law torts, the
Court did specifically limit its holding by stating that "'[s] ome
state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect."44 Thus, even
though the Morales decision did not define the scope of "ser-
vice," the "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner" excep-
tion to preemption offered many courts the needed persuasive
language to permit state tort actions to proceed.45
40 See id. at 383. The Court expounded that preemption may be either express
or implied, depending on whether Congress explicitly states so or whether it can
be gleaned from the purpose of the statute. See id. Either way, statutory intent
based on the ordinary meaning of Congress's language forms the basis for deter-
mining legislative purpose. See id.; see also In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on
July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1056, 1058-59 (D. S.C. 1996) (discussing express and
implied preemption).
41 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1158 (5th ed.
1979)).
42 Id. at 388 (stating that "every one of the guidelines.., bears a 'reference to'
airfares").
43 See id. at 390.
44 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)). As it
did in Shaw, the Court again refrained from further discussing the "too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral" standard. See id. (stating that "we express no views about
where it would be appropriate to draw the line").
45 See, e.g., Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998); Lathigra v.
British Airways PLC, 41 F.3d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1994); West v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding the state law tort claim "too tenu-
ously connected to airline regulation to trigger preemption"); Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc. 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993); Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft,
Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d
1438 (10th Cir. 1993); Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bayne
v. Adventure Tours USA, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Fenn v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Chouest v. American Air-
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B. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. V. WOLENS
In 1995, the Supreme Court revisited the preemption issue in
Wolens to determine, in part, whether the ADA preempted a
common law breach of contract claim arising out of a frequent
flyer program.4 6 This time focusing on the meaning of the
words "to enact or enforce any law," the majority held that a
common law breach of contract claim was not preempted.47
The Court reasoned that the terms and conditions of frequent
flyer programs that airlines offer and passengers accept are pri-
vate obligations that do not rise to the level of state enactment
or enforcement of any law as contemplated by § 1305(a) (1).48
Accordingly, the majority held that the ADA's preemption provi-
sion does not apply to Wolens's breach of contract claim.49
Although Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion did not specifi-
cally discuss whether common law torts were pre-empted, sev-
eral other Justices did. Justice Stevens opined that "[i]n my
lines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. La. 1993); O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 838 F.
Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Air Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich.
1993); Butcher v. City of Houston, 813 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Margolis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Stewart v. American
Airlines, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1991); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Colo. 1988).
46 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226-27. The Wolens case arose out of two consolidated
Illinois class action lawsuits relating to American Airlines' AAdvantage frequent
flyer program. See id. at 224. The plaintiffs alleged that American's modification
to the plan in 1988 "devalued the credits" members had already accumulated. Id.
at 225. Seat availability limits and altered travel blackout dates were among the
changes members complained of. See id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged viola-
tion of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and common law breach of contract. See
id. at 225.
47 See id. at 232. The Court's decision reported here actually came after the
second grant of certiorari. In the first grant, the Court vacated the Illinois
Supreme Court's judgment and remanded for further consideration consistent
with the then-recent Morales decision. See id. at 225-26 (citing Wolens, 506 U.S.
803 (1992)); see also supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text discussing Morales.
On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed its decision finding that the
ADA did not preempt either the Consumer Fraud Act claims or the breach of
contract claims. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226. The Court's decision after the sec-
ond grant of certiorari reversed the Illinois Supreme Court with respect to the
Consumer Fraud Act claims (they were preempted), but affirmed the Illinois
Supreme Court's judgment as to the breach of contract claim (not preempted).
See id.
48 See id. at 228-29.
49 See id. at 232-33. Similar to Morales, however, Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion held that the ADA's preemption provision did preempt the Consumer
Fraud Act claims, and reversed the Illinois Supreme Court as to those claims. See
id. at 226.
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opinion, private tort actions based on common-law negligence
or fraud.., are not pre-empted. ' '50 Every person, including an
airline, "has a duty to exercise reasonable care" towards others
under ordinary tort principles. 5' Thus, if the airlines are negli-
gent in a way that relates to rates, routes, or services, the plaintiff
should be allowed to sue in state court.52 Recognizing that in
some remote way, suits against an airline, including negligence
claims, relate to rates, routes, or services, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that "[s]urely Congress did not intend to give airlines
free rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the supervi-
sion of the Department of Transportation. 53 Justice Stevens ad-
ded that a presumption against preemption is particularly
applicable in ADA negligence cases because Congress specifi-
cally retained the savings clause, which preserved state remedies
existing at common law.54
Similarly, Justice O'Connor also offered some insight into pre-
emption of state tort claims by opining that not every personal
injury claim brought under state common law is preempted.
Endorsing the "too tenuously related" exception espoused in
Morales, Justice O'Connor noted a number of state court claims
decided after Morales that were not subject to ADA
preemption.56
50 Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51 See id. at 236.
52 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 236.
5- Id. at 237.
54 See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c).
55 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 242 (0' Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part). From her dissent, these exceptions to preemption would appear to be
the minority rule since Justice O'Connor went on to emphasize the ADA's "broad
preemptive sweep." Id. at 245. In similar fashion, Justice O'Connor noted Con-
gress's explicit approval of Morales when revisiting the ADA's preemption provi-
sion in 1994, and said Congress agreed with the broad preemptive scope decided
in Morales. See id. at 246 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, p. 83 (1994)). In
part due to these reasons, Justice O'Connor believed that the ADA preempted
both the Consumer Fraud Act claims and the breach of contract claim. See id. at
238 (stating "I would hold that none of respondents' actions may proceed").
56 See id. at 242 (citing both appellate and district court cases, including
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993); Public Health Trust v.
Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (lth Cir. 1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993); Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 849 F. Supp.
179 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Bayne v. Adventure Tours USA, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1994);
Fenn v. American Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Chouest v.
American Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. La. 1993); O'Hern v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1993); In reAir Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352
(E.D. Mich. 1993); Butcher v. Houston, 813 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Tex. 1993)).
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C. APPLICATION OF THE ADA's PREEMPTION PROVISION AFTER
MORA4LE-S AND WOLENS
Unfortunately, neither the Morales decision nor Justice Ste-
vens's or Justice O'Connor's opinions in Wolens offered much
insight into whether Congress intended the word "service" to
include the types of airline activity that often result in personal
injury to a passenger.-" Rather than determining whether Con-
gress intended the term "service" in the preemption clause to
encompass the type of actions that constitute the garden variety
type of airline negligence, the Supreme Court's efforts in
Morales and Wolens left the question of whether the ADA pre-
empted state tort claims unsettled. 8 At best, the Court's efforts
in both cases provide a strong argument for the proposition that
the preemption provision does not act as an absolute bar to all
state tort claims. 9
The lack of definitive guidance following the Morales and
Wolens decisions caused the courts in subsequent cases to con-
tinue to struggle with the issue of whether the ADA should pre-
empt state tort claims.60 As a result, courts have reached
inconsistent results on preemption issues. More importantly,
without a clear definition of what "service" meant, courts contin-
ued to apply different standards to determine whether a state
tort claim should be subject to preemption. Some of the stan-
dards found in the case law include (1) the "too tenuous or re-
mote" standard; (2) the "operation vs. services" standard; (3)
the "not expressly related" standard; and (4) the "forbidden sig-
nificant economic effect" standard. A brief discussion of each
standard follows.
57 See Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F. 3d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating
that "'[slervice' is not defined in the [ADA] itself, and the Supreme Court has
not attempted to define the scope of the term").
58 See In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litigation, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139 (D.
Minn. 1999) (stating that since Wolens and Morales, circuit courts "have since
struggled to draw the line that separates allowable state law claims from ADA-
preempted ones").
59 As noted earlier, even Justice O'Connor, who strongly supported a broad
preemptive sweep in her Wolens dissent, recognized that the ADA's preemption
clause "does not mean that personal injury claims against the airlines are always
preempted." Wolens, 513 U.S. at 242 (O'Connor, J. concurring and dissenting in
part); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60 See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 192; In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litig., 37 F.
Supp. 2d at 1139 (noting that the courts have "struggled to draw the line" that
separates preemption from non-preemption).
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1. The "Too Tenuous or Remote" Standard
Following the Morales decision that some claims may be re-
lated in "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner"61 to war-
rant preemption, a number of courts applied this distinction to
determine whether a state tort claim should be preempted even
though the claim would otherwise "relate to" services in a broad
sense. 62 The Fourth Circuit applied this standard in Smith v.
Comair when it determined that a passenger's claim based on
the airline's refusal to allow him to board was not preempted.63
Although the Comair court found that "boarding" constituted a
"service," it nevertheless held that Smith's claim was not pre-
empted because the denial of boarding was based on airline
conduct that "too tenuously relates or is unnecessary to an air-
line's services. "64
2. The "Operation vs. Services" Standard
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit adopted the "operation vs. services"
distinction in Gee v. Southwest Airlines.65 Relying on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's 1995 decision in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,66 the Ninth
Circuit agreed that a distinction between "operation and main-
tenance" versus "negligent rendition of services" is mandated by
the Morales and Wolens decisions as well as by ADA
§ 137 1(q)(1). 67 Section 13 7 1(q)(1) required airlines to main-
tain liability insurance to cover injuries "resulting from the oper-
ation or maintenance of aircraft." 68
With this distinction in mind, the Ninth Circuit found that
claims stemming from the negligent rendition of services were
preempted, whereas claims stemming from the operation or
61 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
62 See, e.g., Comair, 134 F.3d at 259; Lathigra, 41 F.3d at 540; West v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding the state law tort claim
"too tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger preemption"); Union
Iberoamericana v. American Airlines, Inc., 1994 WL 395329 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Martin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 630 So.2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
63 See Comair 134 F.3d at 258-59.
64 Id. at 259.
65 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
66 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
67 See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1406-07 (stating that "[i]t would make little sense for
Congress to require insurance to pay for bodily injury claims if airlines were insu-
lated from such claims by the ADA's preemption provision").
68 See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371 (q) (1) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41112(a)).
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maintenance of the aircraft were not.69 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the ADA preempted Gee's negligence
claim against the airline for negligently serving liquor to obnox-
ious passengers.7 0 The Court reasoned that Gee's negligence
claim for emotional distress "'related to' the service of alcoholic
beverages to passengers and the crew's in-flight conduct towards
unruly passengers."71
In the same opinion, however, the Ninth Circuit found that
another passenger's negligence claim for personal injury suf-
fered when luggage fell on her head from an overhead bin was
not preempted.72 Quoting the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Hodges,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "'whether luggage may be
placed in overhead bins and whether the flight attendants prop-
erly monitor compliance with overhead rack regulations are
matters that pertain to the safe operation of flight,' and thus are
not preempted."73
3. The "Not Expressly Related" Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit offered this dis-
tinction to avoid preemption in Travel All Over the World, Inc. v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.7 4 Here, the court considered whether
preemption applied to bar a travel agency's claim that the air-
lines slandered it with defamatory statements. 75 The court held
that preemption did not apply because the false statements
about the travel agency did not "expressly refer" to "airline rates,
routes, or services."76
4. The "Forbidden Significant Economic Effect" Standard
Relying on language used in the Morales opinion, the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Travel All also stands for the proposition
that preemption does not lie absent a showing that the conduct
has a significant economic effect that is forbidden under the
69 See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1406-07.
70 See id.
71 Id. The Ninth Circuit analogized this case to its earlier decision in Harris v.
American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995). There, the court also pre-
empted a passenger's tort claims stemming from alcohol being served to an ine-
briated, disruptive passenger because it related to "service." See id. at 1404.
72 Id. at 1407.
73 Id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339).
74 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).
75 See id. at 1433.
76 Id.
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purpose of the ADA.77 Applying this distinction, the Travel All
court opined that the false statements uttered by the airline did
not have the "forbidden significant [economic] effect" on "air-
line rates, routes, or services" as set forth in Morales.78 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs claim was not preempted.79
As evidenced by the various ways in which the courts distin-
guished preemption issues, it is not surprising that the courts
often reached different results despite similar factual scena-
rios. 0 Absent any clear guidance from the Supreme Court, and
without definitive legislative history to determine the ADA's pre-
emptive scope, it seemed inevitable that courts would continue
to grapple with the preemption provision's intended reach."1 At
the heart of this dilemma was whether "related to services"
meant that the ADA preempted state tort claims. Of the three
choices among the words "fares, routes, or services," tort activity
intuitively fell more in line with the meaning of "services."
Until 1998, no court had definitively determined what the
term "services" meant under the ADA. If Congress did not in-
tend "services" to mean such activity as flight attendant services,
the stowing of baggage, and the boarding of passengers, for ex-
ample, then negligence suits based on these types of activities
would not be preempted. Fortunately, in 1998 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized this issue and determined that the
typical airline service-oriented activity that gave rise to the most
common airline negligence claims was not the type of "service"
contemplated by the ADA's preemption provision. 82 By resolv-
77 See id.
78 Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 388).
79 See id.
80 See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 192 (citing two defamation cases where a
slander claim was preempted in one case but not in the other).
81 Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit stated the problem quite succinctly
when he said that "[t]he fact that the majority and the dissent disagree ...
promises uncertainty and inconsistent results." Hodges, 44 F.3d at 340
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring). In Gee, Judge O'Scannlain noted again that the
"majority rule will no doubt yield confusing and conflicting results in the future."
110 F.3d at 1409.
82 The Ninth Circuit illustrated the potential inequitable results as follows:
[U]nder the rule announced in Gee, a plaintiff injured when struck
by a beverage cart door would be able to bring a tort action if the
door swung open because a bolt was missing (because the injury
arises out of the "operations and maintenance" of the aircraft), but
not if the flight attendant negligently failed to latch the door prop-
erly (because the flight attendant's conduct relates to "service").
Charas v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1998).
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ing this uncertainty, the Ninth Circuit may well have clarified an
issue in aviation tort law that has bewildered the federal courts
since the ADA's enactment.
IV. CHARAS V. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.:
DEFINING "SERVICE" UNDER THE ADA
In Charas,8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc,84 sua sponte considered five consolidated cases to rethink its
previous decisions relating to the scope of the ADA's preemp-
tion of state tort law claims.8 5 A brief synopsis of each case
follows.
A. CONSOLIDATED CASES REVIEWED IN CHARAS86
1. Beverage v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
Mr. Beverage claimed that a flight attendant hit and injured
his shoulder while the attendant pushed a service cart down the
aisle.87 Mr. Beverage filed a state law tort claim against Conti-
nental Airlines for negligence and breach of contract.88 The
federal district court granted Continental's motion to dismiss
finding that the ADA preempted Mr. Beverage's state tort claim.
Mr. Beverage appealed.
2. Jacoby v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Ms. Jacoby alleged that falling luggage injured her head after
the plane landed and another passenger opened an overhead
bin. 9 Ms. Jacoby filed a negligence suit in state court against
83 160 F.3d at 1259.
84 In a footnote, the court stated that "[b]ecause of the need to clarify the law
in this area, these cases were taken en banc after they were assigned to a three-
judge panel, but prior to the panel's rendering a decision." Id. at 1261 n.1.
85 See id. at 1259. The consolidated cases on review came from various districts,
including three cases from the Northern District of California, one from the
Southern District of California, and one from the District of Hawaii. See id. at
1260. The en banc panel was made up of eleven circuit judges: ChiefJudge Hug,
and Judges Browning, Fletcher, Brunetti, Thompson, Fernandez, Rymer, T. G.
Nelson, Kleinfeld, Tashima, and Silverman. Judge Silverman wrote for the panel.
See id. at 1261.
86 These synopses are relevant to this discussion for several reasons. First, they
serve as a factual context upon which the Charas court ultimately rendered its
decision. Second, they serve as good illustrations of the so called "garden variety"
personal injury claim that airlines frequently face.
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TWA, which the airline removed to federal district court.9 The
district court granted TWA's motion to dismiss on the ground
that the ADA preempted her state tort law claim.91
3. Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Charas sued TWA in federal district court, alleging state law
tort claims for negligence after she allegedly fell over luggage
left in the aisle by a TWA flight attendant.9 2 The district court
granted TWA's motion to dismiss on grounds that the ADA pre-
empted Charas' state tort law claim.93
4. Gulley v. American Airlines, Inc.
Ms. Gulley, a passenger on an American Airlines commuter
flight, claimed that she told American of a bone condition that
made her susceptible to fractures.9 4 Gulley also alleged that she
advised American that she required special assistance to disem-
bark the plane, but that American employees offered no assist-
ance.95 Gulley maintained that she fell and sustained injuries
while exiting down the stairway equipped with only a single
chain handhold.96 Ms. Gulley sued American for common law
negligence.97 The district court granted American's motion for
summary judgment, finding that the ADA preempted Gulley's
negligence claim because the rendering of assistance down the
stairs related to a "service."9 8
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 Ms. Charas alleged that she suffered a fractured humerus and a shoulder






97 See id. at 1261-62. Ms. Gulley also claimed that American used a plane with a
stairway that was unsafe in violation of California Civil Code section 2101. See
Gulley v. American Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 483, 483 (9th Cir. 1999). The lower
court allowed this claim to proceed after it concluded that providing safe equip-
ment related to "maintenance and operation" of the plane, which was not pre-
empted by the ADA. See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1262. Ajury subsequently handed
down a defense verdict for American on this claim. See Gulley, 176 F.3d at 483.
98 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1262.
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5. Newman v. American Airlines, Inc.
Ms. Newman claimed that when she made reservations to fly
on American she informed American that she was blind, suf-
fered from a heart condition, and required assistance in board-
ing the plane.99 On her return flight, a flight attendant learned
of her heart condition and reported it to the captain.100 The
captain required Ms. Newman to produce her physician's tele-
phone number to verify that she was permitted to fly with her
heart condition. 10 ' Ms. Newman could not remember the tele-
phone number, and American denied her boarding privileges
until she could produce the required documentation. 10 2 Be-
cause she had to wait for the documentation, Ms. Newman was
forced to stay overnight in a motel.' While attempting to
board a shuttle bus to take her to the motel, she fell and sus-
tained injuries.10 4 Ms. Newman sued American for various state
tort law claims.10 5 The district court granted American's motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the ADA preempted
Newman's state tort claims. 106
B. THE CI-ARAS COURT'S DECISION
In considering the preemption issues presented by these five
cases, the Charas court recognized that the scope of the ADA's
preemption provision has been a "source of considerable dis-
pute since its enactment." 07 The Court reflected on two of its
prior decisions that attempted to interpret the scope of the
ADA's preemption provision, Harris v. American Airlines, Inc.'
and Gee v. Southwest Airlines,09 and concluded that it had de-





103 See id. This fact was subsequently amended to read: "Prior to obtaining the
required certificate, Newman was not permitted to board and was required to
stay overnight at a motel." See Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 594,
594-95 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
104 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1262.
105 See id.
1o See id. at 1262.
107 Id. at 1263.
10 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
10 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
110 Harris stood for the proposition that under a plain reading of the preemp-
tion provision, if it "related to" "service" of any type, including service normally
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ruled Harris and Gee, and concluded that in enacting the ADA,
"Congress did not intend to preempt passengers run-of-the-mill
personal injury claims." '111 Definitively deciding what Congress
intended by the word "service," the court held that:
Congress used the word "service" in the phrase "rates, routes, or
service" in the ADA's preemption clause to refer to the prices,
schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point trans-
portation of passengers, cargo or mail. In the context in which it
was used in the Act, "service" was not intended to include an air-
line's provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to pas-
sengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.1 2
In reaching its conclusion, the Charas court offered several
sound reasons to support its new definition of "service." First,
the definition was consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Second, the definition was supported by the plain language of
the ADA and its legislative history. Third, the definition was
consistent with other statutory provisions that Congress left un-
touched, including the savings clause and the liability insurance
requirement for airlines.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's efforts in defining the
scope of the ADA's preemption provision in Morales and Wolens
(although falling short of explicitly addressing preemption with
respect to state tort law) clearly made a strong impression in
favor of not preempting most state law tort claims. 1 3 The
Charas court seized the relevant language in each Supreme
Court case as persuasive authority consistent with its new defini-
tion of "service." 14 To that end, the court concluded that
"[a] lthough Morales and Wolens do not directly resolve whether
§ 1305 (a) (1) preemption encompasses state law tort claims, they
associated with flight attendants, it was preempted. See Harris, 55 F.3d at 1476.
The Charas court recognized that this proposition was contrary to Congressional
intent. See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1263.
In Gee, the court adopted the "operations and maintenance" (not preempted)
versus "service" (preempted) standard. See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1410. The Charas
court recognized that "the rule we adopted in Gee was imprecise, difficult to ap-
ply, and inadequately reflective of the ADA's goal of economic deregulation."
Charas, 160 F.3d at 1263.
"I Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261.
112 Id.
11 See id. at 1264.
114 See id. at 1264 (quoting Justices O'Connor's and Stevens' concurring opin-
ions in Wolens); see also Supreme Court discussion supra Part III.
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certainly suggest that such claims are not within the intended
reach of preemption."'1 5 The Charas court also recognized that
although the Supreme Court majority decisions in Morales and
Wolens did not address preemption of state tort law personal in-
jury claims, the concurring opinions by Justices O'Connor and
Stevens in Wolens did.116 Specifically, Justice O'Connor wrote:
[M]any cases decided since Morales have allowed personal injury
claims to proceed, even though none has said that a State is not
"enforcing" its "law" when it imposes tort liability on an airline.
In those cases, courts have found the particular tort claims at is-
sue not to "relate" to airline "services," much as we suggested in
Morales that state laws against gambling and prostitution would
be too tenuously related to airline services to be preempted.117
Similarly, Justice Stevens opined that, in his opinion, "private
tort actions based on common-law negligence . . . are not pre-
empted."'1 8 Based on this language, the Charas court concluded
that the Supreme Court certainly suggested that state law tort
claims "are not within the intended reach of preemption."' 19
2. Plain Meaning and Legislative Intent
Applying the canons of statutory construction, the Charas
court examined the plain language of the ADA and its legislative
intent. 120 Congress's clear purpose in enacting the ADA was to
achieve economic deregulation of the airlines. 12 1 Nowhere in
the plain language of the ADA itself, or its legislative history,
does it suggest that Congress intended to preempt state tort law
claims.' 22 Further, the court also noted that Congress could not
have intended to displace state tort law claims because it specifi-
cally left two other provisions of the airline regulation statutes
untouched.
115 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264 (emphasis added).
116 See id. at 1264 (citing American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995)).
117 Id. at 1264 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 242). In a footnote, the Charas
panel emphasized the impact of justice O'Connor's opinion by noting that even
in light of the Supreme Court Majority's "criticism of her "total preemption" ap-
proach, the majority implicitly agreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
personal injury claims are not preempted by the ADA." Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264
n.4 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234 n.9).
118 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 235-36).
19 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264.
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First, 49 U.S.C. § 41112 requires airlines to maintain liability
insurance that covers "amounts for which . . . air carriers may
become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of any per-
son." 123 Obviously, if Congress intended the ADA to preempt all
state tort law claims, there would be no need for the airlines to
carry such insurance. 124 Second, Congress also left untouched
the savings clause set forth in section 1506.125 Under this provi-
sion, "[n]othing contained in [the ADA] shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such
remedies. 126
3. Charas's Definition of "Service" Excludes State Tort Claims from
the ADA's Preemptive Reach
Based on Supreme Court precedent interpreting the ADA,
the Act's clear purpose and legislative intent, and the context in
which the term "service" was used in the Act,1 7 the Charas court
ultimately arrived at a definition of "services." The court held
that "'service' . . . refers to such things as the frequency and
scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to
or from which transportation is provided (This airline provides
service from Tucson to New York twice a day.)" 128 Finding that
Congress did not intend to define "service" more broadly, the
Charas court concluded that "service" in the ADA context does
not mean "the pushing of beverage carts, keeping the aisles
clear of stumbling blocks, the safe handling and storage of lug-
gage, assistance to passengers in need, or like functions."1 29
123 See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(q) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41112(a)) (1994)). The current provision provides that the insurance "must be
sufficient to pay ... for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual or for loss of,
or damage to, property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance of
the aircraft under the certificate." § 4112(a).
124 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265.
125 See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (recodified as 49 U.S.C. § 40120)).
126 Id. The current version provides that "[a] remedy under this part is in addi-
tion to any other remedies provided by law." 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994).
127 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265 (stating the principles of statutory construction
require us to consider the term "service" within its context).
128 Id. at 1265-66.
12 Id. at 1266. Following the en banc panel's Opinion, American Airlines filed
a petition for rehearing due to factual mistakes in the Opinion. See Charas, 169
F.3d at 594. On February 23, 1999, after making a small amendment to the facts
of the Newman case, the panel voted to deny American's petition. See id.
V. DID CHARAS ARRIVE AT THE CORRECT DEFINITION?
Holding the court's definition of "services" up against several
documents of legislative history evidences that the Charas court
derived the correct definition. Specifically, two separate House
Reports indicate that Congress intended the term "service" or
"services" in much the same manner as the Charas court ulti-
mately defined it. In the first House Report, the term "service"
is used repeatedly in connection with the fares that airlines
charge.' The following excerpts illustrate the House's useage:
-"The pre-1975 regulatory system was discouraging experi-
ments with low-fare service which could have benefitted the
industry and the public. 'a3 1
-"The [Civil Aeronautics] Board's previous [fare] policies
discouraged the interstate airlines from providing similar
service.132
Later, the report discusses the federal preemption provision
bill (ADA) and how it will change pre-preemption regulation.
Again, the word "service" is used in a context consistent with the
Charas court's definition:
The Bill (ADA) also eliminates Federal jurisdiction over cer-
tain service which is essentially intrastate in nature. Under ex-
isting law [(i.e. pre-ADA)], the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB")
has jurisdiction over air service between two cities in a state if the
aircraft passes over places outside the State. H.R. 12611 pro-
vides that service between two cities in a State is not subject to
CAB jurisdiction solely because the aircraft passes over places
outside of the State.13
3
In a second House Conference Report, the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference explained that the
purpose of amending the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was to
"encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system
which relies on competitive market forces to determine the
quality, variety, and price of air services. '3  The Conference
goes on to adopt the House's amendment, which refers to "ser-
130 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 2-3, (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3737. The Senate Bill was passed in lieu of the House Bill after the Senate Bill
amended its language to contain much of the text of the House Bill. See id. at 1.
131 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
134 H.R. CONE. REP. No. 95-1779, at 53 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3773 (emphasis added).
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vice" in terms of fares and airline transportation originating
from a certain point and ending at an ultimate destination.1"5
It appears from excerpts of the legislative history that the
Charas court correctly defined "services" in context with "rates"
and "routes." This conclusion is further supported by the
number of other courts that have noted that nowhere in the
legislative history does Congress ever discuss "service" or "serv-
ices" in the context of referring to food, drink, flight attendant
assistance, or any other passenger service-related "safety" aspect
of air transportation. 136 On the contrary, the word "service"
within the legislative history appears to be used in a manner
consistent with the ADA's purpose, which was to free the airlines
from state and federal regulation to enable them to provide
whatever service (i.e. air transportation) they deemed appropri-
ate under current market forces. To interpret the meaning of
"service" differently would serve only to expand its definition be-
yond its contextual meaning and construe it in a manner incon-
sistent with the stated purpose of the ADA.
As the Charas court correctly explained, Congress, by enacting
the ADA, intended to encourage competition; "[ilt did not in-
tend to immunize the airlines from liability for personal injuries
caused by their tortious conduct."'37 Although not addressed by
the court in Charas, this explanation of Congress's intent also
squares with the well-settled principle that common carriers owe
a heightened duty of care to their passengers. 138 This duty has
been described as one in which common carriers "are responsi-
ble for any, even the slightest, negligence and are required to do
all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do
under the ... circumstances."'' 3 9 To interpret Congress's intent
as one requiring preemption would clearly render this height-
135 See id.
136 See, e.g., Riviera v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-1130, 1997 WL 634500
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1997); Dudley v. Business Express, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 199, 206
(D.N.H. 1994).
137 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266.
138 See Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1994); USAIR,
Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Navy, 14 F.3d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Kanto-
nides v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203, 1213 (D.NJ. 1992) (stating
that the common carrier must use the "utmost caution characteristic of very care-
ful prudent men"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 34, at 208-09 & nn.9-10 (5th ed. 1984); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (provid-
ing that "the duty of an air carrier [is] to provide service with the highest possible
degree of safety").
139 USAIR, Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Navy, 14 F.3d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir.
1993).
ened duty requirement meaningless. As noted by the Charas
court, nothing in the legislative history indicates Congress in-
tended such a harsh, immunizing result when it enacted the
ADA.' 4
0
Despite the apparent correctness of Charas's definition of
"service," however, at least one question still remains: will other
courts adopt and apply Charas's definition of "service," or will
courts continue to apply the other various and sundry, albeit less
definitive, preemption analyses in order to determine whether
the ADA preempts future state tort law claims?
VI. THE FUTURE IMPACT OF CHARAS
Although it's too soon to tell what long-term impact the
Charas decision will have on courts outside the Ninth Circuit,
early indications suggest that other courts already agree with
Charas's definition of services. In the short time since the Charas
decision, several federal courts have already cited Charas in a
way that indicates some early agreement with this "new" defini-
tion of "service." 141
In Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,'42 Mrs. Somes sued United
under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute after her hus-
band suffered a heart attack and died while in flight from Bos-
ton to San Francisco. 141 Mrs. Somes alleged that United failed
to equip its aircraft with medical equipment, including a
defibrillator that could have saved her husband.'44 United
moved to dismiss on grounds that the ADA's preemption clause
barred the suit because it "related to" airline "services.' 45 The
district court denied United's motion.1
46
Recognizing that the statute itself does not define "services,"
and that neither the Supreme Court nor the ADA's legislative
14 See Charas, 160 F. 3d at 1266. But see Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 619 F. Supp.
1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that "the common law of common carriers
was not revived" with the enactment of the ADA's preemption provision).
141 See generally Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D. Mass.
1994); Landet v. Air France, 182 F.3d 926, 926 (9th Cir. 1999); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Federal Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 925 (9th Cir. 1999); Taj Mahal
Travel 164 F.3d at 193; In reAir Transp. Excise Tax Litig., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1133,
1139-40 (D. Minn. 1999); Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 406,
410-12 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
142 33 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
143 See id. at 80.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 82.
146 See id. at 83.
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history explicitly addressed the meaning of "services," the court
looked to the recent Charas decision for guidance.1 47 Relying in
part on Charas, the court found that the provision of medical
services equipment is not within the meaning of "services" as
intended by Congress. 148 Applying the Charas definition of
"services," the court reasoned that "[e] mergency medical equip-
ment is not typically provided in the normal course of transport-
ing passengers to and from their destinations, and accordingly
does not fall within the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of airline
'services.' ",149
In a less clear application of the Charas court's definition of
"services," the court in Taj Mahal Travel50 cited Charas as per-
suasive authority in a state law preemption case.15 ' Taj Mahal, a
travel agency, sued Delta for defamation after Delta gave letters
to passengers stating that tickets they purchased from Taj Mahal
were considered stolen.' 52 Taj Mahal asserted that the letter
damaged its business reputation and caused it to lose patrons. 153
Accordingly, Taj Mahal sued Delta, alleging state defamation
and civil RICO claims.' 54 Delta eventually removed the case to
federal court, where the district court found that the ADA's pre-
emption clause preempted Taj Mahal's claims.'5 5 Taj Mahal
appealed.
The Third Circuit held on appeal that the ADA did not pre-
empt Taj Mahal's defamation claim. Referring to the definition
of "services" set forth in Charas, the court stated that "[t] he ap-
proach espoused by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Charas offers a more promising solution.' 1 56 The Charas deci-
sion is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Wolens,
which in turn requires an inquiry into whether a common law
tort claim frustrates deregulation by interfering with market
competition. 157 Agreeing with the analysis set forth in Charas,
147 See id.
148 See 33 F. Supp. 2d at 83-84.
149 Id. at 83 (citing Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261).
150 164 F.3d 186 (3d. Cir. 1998).
151 See id. at 194 (stating "we do not find it conceptually helpful to distinguish
'operation or maintenance of aircraft' from 'service.' The approach espoused
... in Charas offers a more promising solution.").
152 See id. at 188.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 188-89.
156 164 F.3d at 194.
157 See id.
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the court concluded that "focusing on the competitive forces of
the market, rather than on a strained and unsatisfactory distinc-
tion between 'services' and 'operations,' leads to a more accu-
rate assessment of Congressional intent." 58
The Taj Mahal court never concluded, however, that "ticket-
ing" fell outside the definition of "services" as set forth in Charas.
Instead, the Court reverted back to Morales's "too tenuous" dis-
tinction and concluded that Taj Mahal's suit "is simply 'too ten-
uous, remote, or peripheral' to be subject to preemption, even
though Delta's statements refer to ticketing, [which is] arguably
a 'service.'"' 59
For other federal courts that have not yet decided a "services"
related issue arising out of an ADA preemption claim, the
Charas decision may provide persuasive authority for the courts
to reach a much simpler, clearer decision. Rather than relying
on the "too tenuous," "expressly preempted," or "significant
economic effect" standards to determine preemption, courts
can now answer a much simpler question of whether the con-
duct falls within the definition of "service" as intended by Con-
gress.160 An example from the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how
courts in the future may benefit from Charas.
In Parise v. Delta Airlines,"' a 1998 Eleventh Circuit decision
rendered only months before Charas, the court was presented
with a fact scenario that fell well outside Charas's subsequent
definition of "services." Mr. Parise, a Delta Airlines customer
service representative, sued Delta after it terminated him for
having a heated argument with a supervisor. 16 2 Mr. Parise al-
leged that Delta discriminated against him on the basis of age,
and sued under Florida's Civil Rights Act.16 Delta removed the
case to federal court on diversity grounds and asserted that the
ADA preempted Mr. Parise's claim. 164 The district court agreed
and dismissed the suit after concluding that Parise's claim "re-
158 Id.
159 Id. at 195.
160 But as we saw in Taj Maha supra, even the courts that recognize Charas's
definition may still be reluctant to decide a case solely on definitional grounds.
See, e.g., Taj Mahal, 164 F.3d at 195 (using the Morales "too tenuous" distinction
after characterizing ticketing as "arguably a 'service,"' despite implicitly agreeing
with Charas's definition earlier in its opinion).
161 141 F.3d 1463 (11th Cir. 1998).
162 See id. at 1464.
163 See id.
-6 See id. at 1464-65.
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lated to services. 1 65 The district court found that Mr. Parise's
violent outburst related to the "service" of safety that Delta has a
duty to provide.166
Without the benefit of Charas's definition of "services," the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether the ADA preempted Pa-
rise's claim under existing authority and standards, including
the "expressly referring to" or "significant economic effect" stan-
dards.'67 Applying these standards, the Eleventh Circuit cor-
rectly decided that the ADA did not preempt Parise's claim and
reversed the district court's finding of preemption. 16
Although the court reached the correct result, its decision
would have been simpler if it could have examined the issue
under Charas's definition of "service." That is, the court could
have merely asked whether Parise's claim "related to" such
things as the "provision of air transportation to and from various
markets at various times."169 Under this narrower definition of
"services," the Eleventh Circuit could have more readily deter-
mined that Parise's claim fell well outside this definition and
therefore outside the ADA's preemptive scope. Had the Elev-
enth Circuit been privy to this new definition, it may have ar-
rived at the same conclusion without resorting to the more
obscure standards used before Charas.
One must also wonder whether Delta's preemption argument
could have been correctly decided at the district court level if
the court had the benefit of the Charas decision. Indeed, with
authority like Charas, we may see fewer and fewer district courts
incorrectly deciding preemption issues. 170 Because some com-
mentators have predicted that the wake of Charas will produce
much more litigation arising out of airline negligence, 7 1 it
seems fortuitous that the district courts will have the persuasive
authority to correctly decide "service" related ADA preemption
issues in the first instance. In short, Charas offers the courts a
165 See id. at 1465.
166 See id.
167 See 141 F.3d at 1465-66.
168 See id. at 1467-68.
169 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266.
170 The Taj Mahal court specifically pointed out the problem among district
courts. See Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 192. The court noted that "[c]ases in
the District Courts are more numerous [than the appellate courts] and follow a
similar pattern of inconsistency, including divergent results in defamation
claims." Id. at 192 n.4.
171 SeeJennifer M. Kirby, Airline Deregulation Act Does not Preempt Routine Personal
Injury Claims, TRIAL, at 21, 98 (Mar. 1999).
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much more "user-friendly" definition to apply. Moreover, be-
cause Charas endeavored to ground its definition of "service" in
existing Supreme Court precedent, relevant legislative intent,
and sound principles of statutory construction, the district
courts are ensured that a decision consistent with Charas will not
be reversed on appeal. Accordingly, it would seem that the
Charas decision provides future courts with many sound juris-
prudential reasons for deciding passenger service-related ADA
preemption issues consistent with the decision and its definition
of "services."
VII. CONCLUSION
At a time when aviation tort law was unsettded about the scope
of the ADA's preemption provision, the Ninth Circuit, in Charas,
set forth a much needed definition of what Congress intended
"services" to mean under the ADA. With sound legal reasoning,
the court correctly concluded that "services" refers to the "fre-
quency and scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of
markets as to or from which transportation is provided. 172 Con-
gress did not intend "services" to extend to the airline's provi-
sion of beverages, food, passenger assistance, and the like. In
the words of Judge Silverman: "To interpret 'service' more
broadly is to ignore the context of its use; and, it effectively
would result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline
does. It seems clear to us that that is not what Congress
intended."173
Although it is too soon to tell the extent to which other courts
will embrace the Charas definition of "services," it seems both
probable and prudent for the courts to do so. Not only is Charas
legally sound, but it also offers a more economical and efficient
standard for courts to decide service-related ADA preemption
issues. At a time when district courts are deciding preemption
issues incorrectly and inconsistently, and circuit courts are
bound by more obscure standards to assess preemption of gar-
den-variety personal injury claims, the Charas decision is wel-
come authority. Moreover, because some believe that the
Charas decision will breed new life into scores of personal injury
lawsuits against the airlines, the courts may find that the time
has come to adopt a more user-friendly definition to counter an
increasing caseload. Additionally, if the preemption argument
172 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265.
173 Id. at 1266.
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was no longer in the airline's defense arsenal, court dockets may
benefit from increased out-of-court settlements. In short, the
Charas decision fills a void from which other courts can benefit.
Whether they will or not remains to be seen.
Panel Discussion
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